The death of Noah Donohoe, a 14-year-old schoolboy from Belfast, has been the subject of a detailed and sensitive inquest proceeding, raising complex questions of fact, causation, and public safety. The purpose of the inquest, as governed by established principles of coronial law, is not to apportion criminal liability but to determine, insofar as possible, the circumstances in which the deceased came by his death. Central to that process has been the evidence of multiple expert witnesses, each instructed to provide independent opinion within their respective fields of expertise.
Noah Donohoe was reported missing after leaving his home in south Belfast on June 21, 2020. He had intended to meet friends in the Cavehill area but failed to arrive. Following an extensive search operation, his body was discovered six days later, on June 27, within a storm drain culvert in north Belfast. The unusual and distressing circumstances surrounding his disappearance and death prompted a full inquest, heard before a jury at Belfast Coroner’s Court.
The factual matrix of the case required careful examination of both the physical environment in which Noah was found and the broader question of whether adequate safety measures had been implemented by the relevant public authority. To that end, the Coroner’s Service commissioned a number of expert witnesses to address discrete but overlapping issues, including environmental conditions, engineering design, and risk assessment.
A key witness was Professor Carolyn Roberts, whose specialist area lies in environmental science and hydrology. Her role was to assess the physical characteristics of the culvert system, including water flow, tidal influence, and accessibility. Having conducted a site inspection and reviewed extensive evidential material, Professor Roberts formed the opinion that Noah was likely alive at the point of entry into the culvert. She noted that the spacing of the metal grille at the entrance would have allowed a person of his size to pass through without undue difficulty.
Professor Roberts further concluded that, once inside, Noah likely progressed through the culvert in a crouched or stooped posture. The internal environment was described as dark, confined, and structurally complex, factors which, in her view, would have significantly impaired orientation. Of particular relevance was the impact of tidal conditions. Evidence indicated that rising tide levels on the evening in question would have caused a substantial increase in water volume within the culvert. Professor Roberts opined that these conditions were consistent with drowning and that it was highly probable Noah died within the system itself. She also expressed the view that the body was unlikely to have been moved any significant distance by water flow after death, thereby addressing issues of post-mortem displacement.
The inquest also heard from Dr Mark Cooper, a specialist in health and safety and risk management. His evidence was directed toward the adequacy of the risk assessment undertaken by the Department for Infrastructure, the body responsible for the culvert. Dr Cooper’s analysis focused on whether the authority had discharged its duty of care to members of the public, particularly in light of the foreseeable risk that children might access the area.
Dr Cooper was critical of the existing assessment, describing it as insufficiently robust and narrowly focused on risks to maintenance personnel rather than to the general public. He highlighted that the culvert entrance was located in proximity to a children’s playground, thereby increasing the foreseeability of public interaction. In his opinion, the failure to properly identify and evaluate this risk constituted a deficiency in the standard of care expected of a public body. He further suggested that the absence of additional protective measures, such as a security screen, was a material consideration in assessing whether reasonable precautions had been taken. “The decision not to have a security screen is crucial to this case,” he added.
A contrasting perspective was provided by Jeremy Benn, whose expertise lies in hydraulic engineering and water infrastructure. His duty was to evaluate the design and operational characteristics of the culvert and to consider whether the absence of certain safety features amounted to a departure from accepted engineering practice. Mr Benn cautioned against the assumption that the installation of physical barriers, such as screens, would necessarily eliminate risk. Drawing upon empirical data, he observed that such structures have, in certain instances, contributed to fatalities where individuals became trapped or where water flow was impeded.
Mr Benn also placed the culvert within a broader context, noting that it was representative of many similar structures constructed prior to the introduction of more recent guidance discouraging extended underground drainage systems. His conclusion was that, while the risk could not be entirely eliminated, the absence of a security screen did not automatically equate to negligence or a breach of duty. This evidence introduced an important counterpoint to the criticisms advanced by Dr Cooper, highlighting the inherent tension between risk mitigation and unintended consequences.
Mr Benn disagreed with Mr Benn’s assessment of the gradient. “Gradients of 1 in 23 (or even 1 in 10) are not too steep to walk and certainly not to crawl up,” he said.
Mr Benn also claimed Mr Pope’s assessment of the rise of flood risk was too high as he had used “too steep a gradient” in his assessment.
Mr Benn said: “My opinion is that DfI had appropriately assessed the need for inlet security and debris screens and factors taken into account (were) appropriate and consistent with guidance available.”
Further evidence was provided by Brian Pope, a civil engineer with experience in infrastructure design and compliance with regulatory standards. Mr Pope’s analysis centred on whether the culvert, particularly following its refurbishment in 2017, met the standards set out in guidance issued by the Environment Agency. He concluded that the level of hazard associated with the culvert marginally exceeded the threshold at which additional safety measures, including the installation of a security screen, would typically be required.
Mr Pope expressed the view that, had the relevant guidance been properly applied at the time of refurbishment, the decision-making process would likely have resulted in the implementation of such measures. He also suggested that certain aspects of the culvert’s design, including gradient and internal configuration, may have been underestimated in previous assessments. His findings therefore aligned more closely with those of Dr Cooper, reinforcing the argument that the risk to the public had not been adequately mitigated.
The divergence of expert opinion in this case underscores the complexity inherent in assessing liability and causation within a coronial framework. While Professor Roberts’ evidence addressed the immediate circumstances of Noah’s death, the engineering and safety experts focused on broader questions of foreseeability, risk management, and compliance with regulatory standards. The interplay between these strands of evidence is central to the jury’s task in determining the factual narrative.
From a legal perspective, the case engages fundamental principles of negligence, including the existence of a duty of care, the standard expected of a reasonable authority, and the question of breach. It also raises issues concerning causation, particularly whether any identified deficiency in safety measures can be said to have materially contributed to the death. Although an inquest does not determine civil liability, its findings may have significant implications for subsequent proceedings or policy reform.
By Edward Price
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