The case arose from the knife attack on Lieutenant Colonel Mark Teeton in Sally Port Gardens, near Brompton Barracks in Chatham, on 23 July 2024. The judicial outcome — life imprisonment with a minimum term of seven years and 162 days, coupled with detention in hospital for treatment for as long as necessary — reflects the careful deployment of a hybrid order under section 45A of the Mental Health Act 1983. It is a decision rooted not only in the gravity of the offending but also in detailed and convergent expert psychiatric evidence.
The facts of the attack were deeply troubling. Lieutenant Colonel Teeton, a senior Army officer, was assaulted in a public garden space in proximity to a prominent military installation. The assailant used a knife, and the violence was described by the prosecution as sustained and potentially lethal. Emergency services intervened, and the victim survived, though the consequences were serious. Mrs Teeton had rushed to a soldier lying on the ground outside the family home, before realising it was her husband. She pushed Esan off him before realising that he had a knife and “felt a wave of terror” that she may need to run for her life, but the man chose not to go after her.
Mrs Teeton said in her victim impact statement: “I watched horrified by his continued savage attack, and realised it was my husband on the ground and he was carving at his face and neck”.
The prosecution charged Esan with attempted murder pursuant to the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, contending that the evidence demonstrated the requisite intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm with intent.
The Crown’s case was supported by CCTV footage, forensic analysis of the weapon, and eyewitness testimony. The actus reus of the offence was not materially in dispute. However, as the proceedings progressed, it became clear that the central issue would not be whether Esan committed the attack, but rather how his mental state should inform sentencing. The defence raised psychiatric considerations, and the court was invited to examine the applicability of hospital disposal provisions.
In serious cases where mental disorder is raised, expert witness evidence assumes a pivotal role. The Criminal Procedure Rules require that expert testimony be independent, objective and grounded in recognised expertise. In this instance, the court heard from leading specialists in forensic psychiatry and clinical psychology, whose combined assessments shaped the ultimate outcome.
Among the principal expert witnesses was Professor Nigel Blackwood, an expert in forensic psychiatry with extensive experience in the assessment of violent offenders and complex psychiatric presentations. Professor Blackwood’s professional background includes the evaluation of psychotic disorders, the relationship between mental illness and violent ideation, and structured risk assessment. His duty was to assist the court in determining whether Esan was suffering from a mental disorder within the meaning of section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and whether that disorder substantially contributed to the commission of the offence.
Professor Blackwood provided detailed evidence regarding Esan’s psychiatric history and symptomatology. He described a pattern of psychological deterioration characterised by disordered thinking, paranoid ideation and the gradual crystallisation of violent fantasy. In a striking passage of testimony, Professor Blackwood stated that when Esan brought knives back to the family home, he “began to entertain murderous fantasies 18 months before he enacted them.” This observation was advanced not as speculation but as a clinical conclusion drawn from interviews, documentary records and behavioural analysis.
The significance of this evidence lay in its temporal dimension. The professor explained that the development of violent ideation over such a period reflected a pathological trajectory rather than mere criminal planning. In individuals suffering from untreated psychotic illness, intrusive fantasies can become fixed and elaborated, particularly where there is social withdrawal and cognitive distortion. Professor Blackwood concluded that Esan’s mental illness materially impaired his judgment and distorted his perception of reality at the time of the attack.
The court also heard from a second consultant forensic psychiatrist instructed independently. This expert, whose professional expertise included the assessment of defendants in high-security settings, undertook a comprehensive evaluation involving clinical interviews, review of prior medical records and analysis of the index offence. The psychiatrist reached conclusions consistent with those of Professor Blackwood. Esan was found to be suffering from a severe mental illness within the statutory definition, and that illness was considered causally linked to his conduct on 23 July 2024.
The second psychiatrist elaborated on the clinical features of the disorder, including delusional beliefs and impaired capacity to evaluate consequences. The expert emphasised that while the physical acts were deliberate in a narrow behavioural sense, they were driven by a distorted internal narrative shaped by psychosis. This distinction was crucial for the sentencing court. The law recognises that even where intent is technically established, the presence of substantial mental impairment may mitigate culpability and justify therapeutic intervention.
In addition to psychiatric testimony, a consultant clinical psychologist specialising in violence risk assessment was called to assist the court. The psychologist’s expertise lay in structured professional judgment methodologies and the identification of both static and dynamic risk factors. Employing recognised assessment tools, the psychologist evaluated Esan’s propensity for future harm. Static factors included the seriousness of the index offence and the presence of violent ideation. Dynamic factors encompassed untreated psychosis, medication non-compliance and social instability.
The psychologist informed the court that the risk of serious violence would remain elevated in the absence of sustained psychiatric treatment. However, with appropriate pharmacological management, psychological therapy and secure supervision, the risk could be substantially mitigated. This evidence was directly relevant to the statutory criteria for a hospital order and restriction order, which require consideration of both treatment necessity and public protection.
A further forensic psychiatric expert addressed the court on the practical operation of hospital detention. This specialist, experienced in the management of secure psychiatric facilities, outlined the therapeutic regimes available within medium and high-security hospitals. The court was advised that treatment would likely involve antipsychotic medication, cognitive behavioural interventions and continuous multidisciplinary review. The expert explained that progress would be assessed periodically and that discharge would depend upon demonstrable clinical stability and reduced risk.
The convergence of expert opinion was notable. All specialists agreed that Esan met the criteria for detention under section 37 of the Mental Health Act and that the seriousness of the offence warranted the additional safeguard of a restriction order under section 41. In effect, there was no material divergence in diagnosis or risk evaluation. This unanimity provided the court with a clear evidential foundation.
The sentencing judge was therefore confronted with the task of reconciling two imperatives: the denunciatory function of criminal sentencing for attempted murder, and the therapeutic objective mandated by mental health legislation. Attempted murder with a bladed weapon in a public setting ordinarily attracts life imprisonment. The aggravating features were self-evident — the choice of weapon, the public location and the potential for fatal consequences. The impact upon the victim and the wider community was profound.
Yet the court also accepted that Esan’s mental disorder substantially contributed to the offence. The statutory mechanism enabling a balanced response is section 45A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which permits the imposition of a life sentence together with a hospital direction. Under this hybrid order, the offender is detained initially in hospital for treatment. If and when treatment is no longer deemed necessary, the offender may be transferred to prison to continue serving the custodial sentence.
Sentencing him on Friday, Mr Justice Picken said: “The attack on Mr Teeton was targeted and deliberate. “You were looking for a soldier with the intention that that soldier should die, as underlined by the fact you had looked up the killing of Lee Rigby on the internet.”
Accordingly, the judge imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of seven years and 162 days, alongside a hospital direction. Esan will therefore remain detained in a secure psychiatric facility for as long as treatment is required. Any future transfer or release will be subject to rigorous scrutiny, including oversight by the Secretary of State in the case of restricted patients and assessment by the Parole Board in relation to the life sentence.
Mr Justice Picken told Esan he presents a “significant risk” to the public, adding: “You are unlikely ever to be released back into the community where there is a risk of reoccurrence.”
For legal practitioners, the case underscores the indispensable role of expert witnesses in navigating the interface between criminal liability and mental disorder. Professor Nigel Blackwood’s evidence regarding the prolonged emergence of murderous fantasies was central to understanding the defendant’s psychological trajectory. The corroborative assessments of additional forensic psychiatrists and the structured analysis of a clinical psychologist ensured that the sentencing decision rested upon a robust and multidisciplinary evidential base.
The Esan case illustrates the capacity of the criminal justice system to respond to serious violence with both firmness and nuance. Life imprisonment reflects the enduring seriousness of attempted murder. Hospital detention acknowledges the clinical realities that shaped the offending. Guided by authoritative expert testimony, the court crafted a sentence that prioritises public protection while recognising the imperative of psychiatric treatment. In doing so, it reaffirmed that justice, when informed by expertise, can be both exacting and humane.Ps
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